

EXPERIENCING THE FUTURE: KANTIAN THOUGHTS ON HUSSERL¹

Eric M. Rubenstein
Indiana University of Pennsylvania

Attempting to understand our experience of time we confront two images. On the one hand, our experience is depicted as awareness of the present which itself is but an instantaneous, point-like event, one which is forever eluding our grasp.

Time as ordinarily conceived is sundered into separate moments which are perpetually passing away. The past is forever dead and gone, the future is non-existent and uncertain, and the present seems, at most, a bare knife-edge existence separating these two unrealities.²

In fact the only time that can be called present is an instant, if we can conceive of such, that cannot be divided into even the most minute fractions, and a point of time as small as this passes so rapidly from the future to the past that its duration is without length.³

Alternatively, according to another tradition, our experience is of a temporal spread- a temporal field that stretches well beyond an instantaneous 'now'. Husserl gives voice to this with talk of a 'temporal horizon', for instance, while Merleau-Ponty characterizes this experience in terms of a 'field of presence'.⁴

The world now present to me, in every waking 'now' obviously so, has its temporal horizon, infinite in both directions, its known and unknown, its intimately alive and its unalive past and future.⁵

It is in my 'field of presence' in the widest sense- this moment that I spend working, with, behind it the horizon of the day that has elapsed, and, in front of it, the evening and the night- that I make contact with time...⁶

Moreover, says that tradition, not only do we experience temporal spreads, not points, our experiences are alive with times other than the present. Past and future times are themselves part of our experience of time.

Truly...it pertains to the essence of the intuition of time that in every point of its duration...it is consciousness of *what has just been* and not mere consciousness of the now-point of the objective thing appearing as having duration.⁷

Everything, therefore, causes me to revert to the field of presence as the primary experience in which time and its dimensions make their appearance unalloyed...It is here that we see a future sliding into the present and on into the past. Nor are these three dimensions given to us through discreet acts...I do not think of the evening to come and its consequences, and yet it 'is there', like the back of a house of which I can see only the façade...⁸

All the same, understanding is in every case a Present which 'is in the process of having been.' All the same, one's state-of-mind temporalizes itself as future which is 'making present'. And all the same, the Present 'leaps away' from a future that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future.⁹

Contrary then to what might be called the ‘instantaneous-present’ tradition, this other tradition suggests that our experience of time is properly seen as one of a temporal spread, one that includes both the past and the future. I aim in this essay to make sense of such a picture, paying particular attention to the claim that our experience of a temporal spread somehow involves the future. After all, *prima facie*, the future does not exist, and it is thereby rather mysterious how we could experience it.

As we will see, focusing on the possibility of a non-existent future entering our experiences parallels what has come to be known as the problem of the specious present. The puzzle I wish to examine is the future-oriented correlate of the specious present, which is itself concerned with the presence of the past in experience. I will argue that accounts of such temporal spreads, ones which include elements of the past and future, can make sense only if we add a Kantian grounding. Namely, we must add the Kantian thesis that time is an *a priori* representation. Having argued for this, I’ll say something about the manner in which the future enters into our experiences. That is, the first part of the paper will address the possibility of such future directed experiences, exploring the necessary ingredients if such an experience is to be had. The latter portions will address the actuality of such experiences, engaging in a bit of phenomenology, as it were.

Finally, before beginning, I should indicate what this essay is *not* about. I am not interested in the status of the past and future with respect to their existence, their openness or closedness, nor with questions about the predication of truth-values to such times. Nor am I concerned with McTaggart-inspired debates over A and B series analyses of time. Rather, I am concerned solely with an examination of our experience of time, with an eye to elucidation of the puzzling phenomenon of experiencing the future. In short, is there a sense in which our temporal experiences involve a future element, and if so, how are we to understand those experiences and that future element?

I. The Future in Recollection

As an entry point to our discussion I wish to begin with an interesting case. Husserl describes the sort of experience I have in mind.

Recollection is not expectation; its horizon, which is a posited one, is, however, oriented on the future, that is, the future of the recollected. As the recollective process advances, this horizon is continually opened up anew and

becomes richer and more vivid. In view of this, the horizon is filled with recollected events which are always new. Events which formerly were only foreshadowed are now quasi-present, seemingly in the mode of the embodied present.¹⁰

Here we are to focus on the recollection of an experience which itself was temporally extended. As we recall the beginning of that experience we anticipate the remaining temporal portions of that experience. And though Husserl does not provide an example of this sort of experience I believe an apt one would be the recalling of a familiar melody. Thus in rehearsing a melody we anticipate the notes that are to come *after* the ones that we are presently entertaining (or, singing to one's self we might say). Our experience of recollection of that melody is not an experience of temporally discrete moments, where future portions of the melody arise *ex nihilo* as we move along Lovejoy's 'bare knife-edge of existence'. Rather, even while we are rehearsing a particular note, that experience is permeated with what is to come- those notes which comprise the future portion of the melody. Indeed, we might say that only because we are so aware of those future portions that when it is time to sing *them* that we know how to.

Thus while we are recollecting, and thereby making contact, in some sense, with the past, we are at the same time, in some sense, making contact with future times. Admittedly, this is not contact with the future in a fully rich sense. Rather, it is the contact with the future of a past episode. Even still, this provides a useful starting point for further reflections.

The question I wish to address now is whether we can simply abstract from this case of protentions in recollection to protentions *simpliciter*. Put somewhat differently, is our experience of the future, the kind present in our experience of a temporal spread, based on or derived from this sort of case? Is our representation or experience of the future based on protentions in recollection?

If our general experience or representation of the future *could* be analyzed in terms of such recollections, we might be able to derive the two sorts of protentions which seem true to our experiences. First, there are experiences in which particular, future events loom on the temporal horizon; *empirical* protentions, we might say. This, for instance, is the sort of case imagined by Hume, though certainly not under that description. Hume notes that after repeated experiences of the conjunction of two events, should we come to experience one we will be led to expect the other. He makes use of this in his account of necessary connection, of course, though as a point of phenomenology it extends to a far broader category of experiences. For instance, given our familiarity with the lay out of the college grounds, rounding one building we expect to find a certain

tree; in listening to a familiar record we expect a certain song to begin at the conclusion of another.¹¹

Second, there are experiences of the future, which while difficult to describe, nevertheless seem to be part of our experience of time. In contrast to empirical protentions we might call these *pure* protentions. Here we are not expecting or anticipation some object, some event. Rather, we are ‘aware’ of time itself, as that which is flowing towards us, or alternatively, of that open time which we are moving towards. Such experiences would be feelings, to adapt Heidegger’s terminology, of being thrown-ahead of ourselves. In addition to the sort of empirical protentions discussed above, our experience of the temporal spread does, at least in some cases, include these sorts of pure protentions. The difference between empirical and pure protentions would be between the protention of an event and the protention of time itself we might say. What’s more, we might think we can get to the latter by abstracting from experiences of the former, themselves derived from our initial case of protentions in recollection.

In summary, having begun with an account of protentions in recollection I have located two senses in which we may be said to experience or represent the future. And I have raised the possibility that these may be ‘recovered’ from experiences of protention in recollection. Ultimately I wish to argue that this cannot be the whole story. In short, we must presuppose an experience or representation of the future to even make *sense of protentions in recollection*. We cannot simply derive more complex cases of empirical and pure protentions from protentions in recollection, for the latter themselves already presuppose, we might say, a representation of the future. As we shall see, this is in effect Kant’s thesis that time is an *a priori* representation, one which cannot be derived from experiences of temporal relations. In the latter parts of this paper I will discuss Kant explicitly. For now more stage-setting is required.

II. The Past and Specious Present

As a step towards arguing that the future must be presupposed to even make sense of protentions in recollection, let us begin by considering what is required for a representation of the past itself. Here we should consult Husserl, whose detailed discussions have been so highly influential in articulating our experiences of time. And though Husserl distances himself from explicit talk of the ‘specious present’, rejecting the psychological and empirical elements present in discussions under that title, I take him to be chasing essentially the same phenomenon. Namely, how can an act of

awareness which is instantaneous, contain as its object of awareness something which is extended in time? Put differently, but to the same point, how can there can be experiences of a duration or succession of events given that certain components of that duration are no longer existent during that *experience* of the duration.

Husserl describes our experience of such duration or objective succession as follows.

The sound is given; that is, I am conscious of it as now, and I am so conscious of it 'as long as' I am conscious of any of its phases as now. But if any temporal phase (corresponding to a temporal point of the duration of the sound) is an actual now (with the exception of the beginning point), then I am conscious of a continuity of phases as 'before', and I am conscious of the whole interval of the temporal duration from the beginning-point to the now point as an expired duration.¹²


His analysis of how this is possible is explained as follows:

That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only in this way, that the succession of psychical processes are united 'forthwith' in a common structure. They are in consciousness one after the other, but they fall within one and the same common act. We do not hear the sounds all at once, as it were, and we do not hear the melody by virtue of the circumstance that the earlier tones endure with the last. Rather, the tones build up a successive unity with a common effect, the form of apprehension...Accordingly, there is a perception of temporally successive unities just as of coexisting ones.¹³

The actual tonal now is constantly changed into something that has been; constantly, an ever fresh tonal now, which passes over into modification, peels off. However, when the tonal now, the primal impression, passes over into retention, this retention is itself again a now, an actual existent. While it itself is actual (but not the actual sound), it is the retention of a sound *that has been*.¹⁴

In other words, in listening to a melody, those portions which have already been played are no more. Yet if we are to be aware of their existence, they have to be somehow, somewhere, in mind, if the music that we hear now is to form part of a melody. Were those earlier portions gone completely, the sounds we are hearing now would mean nothing. They would be individual, detached notes, not portions of a melody. Therefore, that which is past has to be present in some manner in order for our experience to be of a temporal duration.

Husserl aims then to explain the possibility of such experiences of a temporal duration by describing how those items which are, in some sense, no more, can still be experienced as portions of such a duration. Husserl gives us the following picture to help.



On this account, the horizontal line A-C represents the series of notes experienced during a certain interval. Thus at t1, A is perceived, at t2 B is perceived, and then at t3 C is perceived. The question is how, at t3, can the subject be aware of a *series* of notes having been experienced? How, can the subject be aware of a melody, given that at t3 the only sound present is C?

Husserl's answer, in short, is that when A was experienced at t1, it left its mark on the perceiver, such that it was retained in consciousness. The diagonal line A-F represents this retention; likewise for diagonal B-E, which is the retention of the experience of B at t2. Thus at t3, those original experiences are still present to mind, present as retentions of the original experience. In other words, at t3, though the perceiver is presented with a temporally simultaneous array of sounds, namely the vertical line C-F, the perceiver responds with a representation of a temporal sequence. The perceiver, that is, is aware of a melody, though earlier portions of that actual melody are long gone. Again, though the act of awareness at t3 may be instantaneous, the object of awareness is temporally extended.

Now this analysis has been subjected to countless discussions, criticism, elucidations, etc. I do not wish to enter the fray here, either in point of Husserlian exegesis, nor of the merits of the account in total.¹⁵ Rather, I simply wish to point out what strikes me as an important yet missing ingredient in this account. Moreover, this missing ingredient will advance our discussions towards the possibility of representing the future.

Through the elaborate mechanism of retentions Husserl describes, the 'sinking down' of retentions, the perceiver comes to respond to what is in fact a temporally simultaneous array with a judgment about a temporal succession. What is lacking, however, in short, is how such an array *can* give rise to such a temporally oriented experience.

Consider the situation at t3 in the above diagram. At that time the perceiver has before consciousness, so to speak, a number of representations. And let us grant that this manifold of representations are unified into a single act of consciousness. That, recall, was what interested Husserl- how elements which are part of a duration, and thus past, can be part of an instantaneous act of awareness. At t3 then the perceiver has this unified array as the content of its awareness. But where and how does the *temporal* element enter into this awareness? What makes it the case that this array, unified as it may be, is experienced as a *temporal* array, rather than a non-temporal one? How does time enter the picture here at all?

Husserl, after all, began with a succession of representations. That is what happens between t1 and t3, namely, that we are affected by a sequence of notes. Via his account of retentions and their 'sinking down', Husserl finds a way to get all of those representations into a single one, as happens at t3. And though that is helpful, it is not enough. For once those various representations, retentions, are combined into a single representation, what allows for the various aspects of that representation to have a *temporal* component? Where does the 'distant past', 'near past', 'just past' element come from such that that single representation is of a *temporal* succession? We have retained perhaps a series, but what makes it an awareness of a *temporal* series?¹⁶ That is the key question, and one for which Husserl does not have an answer. In short, Husserl simply seems to have helped himself to the temporal element that is needed for a complete account of temporal awareness.¹⁷

We need then to supplement Husserl's account then. The missing ingredient, I propose, is provided by Kant. In short, where Husserl goes wrong is that there is nothing temporally tagged, as it were, in the retentions which gives a temporal element to the representation at t3. Husserl gives us a single representation of a series, but not of a *temporal* one. What is needed is some way to get time or a temporal element into the picture. Without such an element, there would be no temporal aspect in the representations Husserl speaks of. Time is thereby required, but apparently cannot be derived from the unified representation given at t3. For as we saw, that representation lacks the temporal properties we need. If time is required, but cannot be derived, it must be presupposed as already present. Time is required then as an *a priori* representation. And that of course is one of Kant's deepest points in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

For simultaneity or succession would not even enter our perception if the presentation of time did not

underlie them *a priori*. Only on the presupposition of this presentation can we present this and that as being at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (sequentially).¹⁸

The way to get such a temporal element into our representations of a duration (and thus of past occurrences), then, is not by trying to derive it from the sequence of retentions, nor from the instantaneous array, but rather, to presuppose time at the outset. And as we shall see, as for the past, so too for the future. The only way to make possible the representation of the future is to presuppose it at the outset. This will in turn allow us to say something interesting about the nature of such representations of the future.

III. Deriving The Future

We have seen that we cannot make sense of a representation of the past *as past* unless time is somehow built into such representations, that is, unless time is presupposed as an *a priori* representation. Before turning to those arguments we had wondered whether the future could be recovered from a representation of the past. More specifically, we inquired into the possibility of deriving a representation of the future from protentions in recollection. From there we turned to what is necessary to represent the past at all, regardless of whether such representations themselves contained a future-looking element. Having seen that such representations of the past themselves presuppose a representation of time, we can now begin to explore what is required to represent the future.

Let us begin with straightforward attempt. Here I have in mind attempts to derive representations of the future from feelings or cognitive states such as anticipation or expectation we may have at a given, present moment. I submit, however, that this approach must fail, for feelings as anticipation or expectation can offer a ground for representations of the future only if we already presuppose a representation of time (namely of future times) in such feelings. Such feelings or states cannot by themselves serve as an account of the representation of the future.

What after all, is a feeling of anticipation? It is a future-looking state; one of waiting for an event to unfold or be given from the future. If so, then anticipation or expectation already contains a future-looking element, already contains a representation (even if just in a thin sense) of the future. That said, we cannot use such states to make sense of or derive a representation of the future- for such future aspects are already built right into those states.

This no doubt raises the temptation to simply equate representations of the future with such

feelings or states of anticipation and expectation. That is, one could contend that whatever sense there is to the representation of future times simply amounts to the feelings of anticipation we have, our expectations, etc. However, simply having such a feeling of anticipation would not itself count for us as a representation of the future unless we already knew in some way what it would *be* to represent the future. We must, in other words, already have some idea of what counts as being *future*, if we are to be able to glean from experiences of expectation the sort of future-looking element we are seeking.

Having rejected the straightforward model attempt to make sense of representation of the future with such states as anticipation or expectation, we can now return to the question of whether having gained a representation of the past, as made possible by an *a priori* representation of time, we are in a position to abstract or derive representations of the future.

There are two ways to try this. 1) We might simply try to abstract from experiences of the past and the relation of past *pasts* to past *presents* in order to make sense of the future. Alternatively, 2) we might try to simply generalize from experiences of protentions in recollection, those interesting experiences with which we began our discussions. We shall see, however, that such strategies themselves fail, and for precisely the same reasons that Husserl's attempts to derive representations of the past failed- such representations of the past are possible only if time is represented *a priori*. So too for representations of the future. They are possible only if future times are represented *a priori*. Thus we cannot recover such representations from experiences of the past unless somehow built into those experiences themselves are representations of the future.

With respect to (1), consider this extended passage from MP.

A preserved fragment of the lived-through past can be at the most no more than an occasion for thinking of the past, but it is not the past which is compelling recognition; recognition, when we try to derive it from any content whatever, always precedes itself. Reproduction presupposes re-cognition, and cannot be understood as such unless I have in the first place a sort of direct contact with the past in its own domain. Nor can one, a fortiori, construct the future out of contents of consciousness: no actual content can be taken, even equivocally, as evidence concerning the future, since the future has not even been in existence and cannot, like the past, set its mark upon us. The conceivable way, therefore, of trying to explain the relation of future to present would be by putting it on the same footing as that between the present and past. When I consider the long procession of my past states, I see that my present is always passing, and I can steal this passage, treat my immediate past as a remote one, and my actual present as past: ahead of it then is a vacuum, and this is the future. Looking ahead would seem in reality to be retrospection, and the future a projection of the past. But even if, per impossible, I could construct consciousness of the past with transferred presents, they certainly could not open a future for me. Even if, in fact, we form an idea of the future with the help of what we have seen, the fact remains that, in order to project it ahead of us, we need in the first place a sense of the future. If prospection is retrospection, it is in any case an anticipatory retrospection, and how could one anticipate if one had no sense of the future? It is said that we guess 'by analogy' that this inimitable

present will, like all the others, pass away. But for there to be an analogy between presents that have elapsed and the actual present, the latter must be given not only as present, it must already announce itself as what will soon be past, we must feel the pressure upon it of a future intent on dispossessing it; in short the course of time must be primarily not only the passing of present to past, but also that of the future to the present...The past and the future cannot be mere concepts abstracted by us from our perceptions and recollections, mere denominations for the actual series of 'psychic facts'. Time is thought of us before its parts, and temporal relations make possible the events in time.¹⁹

I take it that Merleau-Ponty is rejecting just the sort of strategy (1), I proposed above. In short, without some prior conception of the future, representations of the future, or even of what it would be for something to *be* future cannot be obtained.

To see this more clearly, and to exhibit again the Kantian sentiment that time must be given *a priori*, imagine the following sequence of representations:

- i) At t1, x is represented; at t2 y is represented; at t3 z is represented.

With such a sequence of representations on their own, there would be nothing which makes it the case that such a series is represented as a temporal succession. We are, as of yet, that is, lacking the resources which makes it possible to represent (i) as:

- ii) x was *before* y which was *before* z, which is now *present*.

Recalling our discussions of Husserl, even if we find a way to unify those various representations, making x, y, and z part of a single representation, there must still be something else added to the story to make it the case that x,y, and z are seen as temporally related.

The various elements not only have to be unified into one act of awareness (which Husserl does accomplish), they must as well be so unified such that each element of that one representation is somehow represented as being temporally related to the other elements (which Husserl does not accomplish). With this in mind let us turn to the future.

Making use of the above example, let us consider y to be a recently past event, and z a present one. As we move from t3 to some later time we may notice that y itself moves into the more remote past, and that z, which *was* present, itself becomes past. From that we might infer that as y was followed by z, and that z itself is now past, z itself will be followed by some *new* event. What's more, the ensuing gap between z and that event which *will* follow is what provides for our sense of the future. In other words, as we have experienced the succession of events, we expect that one that was just present will be followed by one in the *future*, given that in the past, remote events were followed by not so remote, but still past events. This, in essence, would be the attempt to

abstract a representation of the future from experiences of the past, the attempt Merleau-Ponty sought to criticize.

The problem with this attempt, however, is just the problem we saw in trying to make sense of Husserl's account of the specious present. There we saw that a sequence of representations would mean nothing to us unless somehow they were, first, unified into a single act, and what's more, unified in such a way that components of the now unified representation were represented as being temporally related to the other. So too with the representation of the future. Only with such a representation of future elements already presupposed would we be able to speak of the future.

Again, simply holding those various representations themselves together, simply unifying them, is itself not enough for a representation of a temporal succession or series. Unifying them would give us a representation of a series, but it would not be one of a temporal series unless we somehow know that those elements of the single, now unified representation, are themselves temporal elements. And this is possible only if time is already built into our representations- only if time is presupposed and given *a priori*. Those items which occurred in the past could take on a significance for us, therefore, of a future element, only if we already presupposed a representation of the future. We cannot make sense of representations of the future simply by abstracting from experiences of succession. That is the upshot of the passage from Merleau-Ponty, itself which can be seen as rehearsal of the important Kantian point.

Having rejected (1), we can now consider strategy (2), which aims to gain a representation of the future by recourse to protentions in recollection- experiences of recall in which there is a future-directed element. However, as we shall see, even making sense of protentions in recollection requires a presupposition of future oriented representations. That is, protentions in recollection are not the innocuous starting points they may have seemed- their very possibility requires an *a priori* representation of time, including a representation of future times.²⁰

The point is easily seen, given the above. For in recalling a melody, that we have expectations of what is to come could signal for us a future-oriented state, could be an indication of what a future-oriented state is, only if we already know what it would be to have a representation of the future. Those feelings of anticipation would be conceptualized as future looking only if, in some sense, we already understood what it is for something to *be* future. Thus while protentions in recollection may make for interesting phenomenology, they can play a role in our ordinary

experience of the future only if we have presupposed an *a priori* representation of time, namely of future times, in such experiences of protention in recollection. And that of course is just the same Kantian point again.

For simultaneity or succession would not even enter our perception if the presentation of time did not underlie them a priori. Only on the presupposition of this presentation can we present this and that as being at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (sequentially).²¹

IV. Formal Intuitions

We have seen that time must be presupposed if we are to have the sort of temporal experience the phenomenologist points to. More specifically, we have seen that we can make sense of experiences of the past and future as such only if time is an *a priori* representation. Thus if we are to make sense of the phenomenologist's talk of experiencing a temporal spread, one which includes future elements, we must include reference to such an *a priori* representation.

However, it is by no means clear exactly what it means to have an *a priori* representation of time, much less an *a priori* representation of future times. I suggest we can make progress by examining Kant's talk of time as a *formal* intuition. Doing so will, on the one hand, provide a more precise formulation of what it means to say time is a necessarily presupposed representation, and on the other, help articulate the nature of our experiences of the future. Kant's account of space and time as formal intuitions is, however, notoriously difficult. Rather than enter into a discussion of the need for such intuitions in Kant's critical philosophy, or of whether Kant himself can allow for such intuitions, given what he says elsewhere in the *Critique*, I aim for something more modest. I hope simply to provide a sketch of just what it means to say that time is a formal intuition, in the belief that such a sketch can shed light on how we experience the future.

In a famous footnote in the Transcendental Deduction Kant offers the following:

But space and time are presented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions (containing a manifold), and hence are presented with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them.²²

Elsewhere we are told that "the original presentation time must be given as unlimited."²³

Expanding on this notion of unlimited, or infinite, given time, Kant remarks that

To say that time is infinite means nothing more than that any determinate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations on a single underlying time.²⁴

Putting these passages together results in the following theses. First, not only is time a form of intuition, it is itself an intuited. In some way, then, time must be a given object of perception, as its representation is an intuition. Of course, the key question is exactly how, since time is clearly not an object of intuition in the way ordinary objects are.²⁵ It is a pure intuition, one lacking matter or as Kant puts it in the Anticipations of Perception, the ‘real of sensation’.

Second, this individual, time, is given as infinite. Third, to say that time is infinite is not to say that we are presented with an individual which is infinitely large. Rather, it is to recognize that whatever determinate region of time we happen to be presented with carries with it the implication that there is a larger time of which that determinate portion is part. Let us call this the ‘containment thesis’; it will play a key role in our analysis.²⁶

Before bringing in the *containment thesis*, I wish to make use of the initial points gleaned from Kant’s account of formal intuitions. The representation of time, we are told, is itself an intuition, meaning that time is an individual which is given to us. How are we to understand this claim, given that we are also told it is a *pure* intuition, one that is not capable of impinging upon our sensibility as other individuals are? Though long ignored by those outside the Continental tradition, Heidegger has valuable things to say here.

Seeking to make sense of such puzzling, unique particulars, as formal intuitions, Heidegger notes that:

Space must be represented as that ‘within which’ any actual thing can be encountered. Space is a pure representation, i.e. that which is necessarily represented in advance in finite human cognition.²⁷

Kant once remarked in a reflection at once striking and direct that ‘space and time are the pre-formative forms in pure intuition’ (Reflexion, II, 408). They form in advance the pure aspect which serves as the horizon of that which is intuited in empirical intuition.²⁸

I take Heidegger to be driving at the sense in which such formal intuitions provide the necessary backdrop for awareness of any determinate object. In the case of space this means, first, that space *qua* formal intuition provides the necessary structural background for experience of any empirical object; and second, though Heidegger himself does not point to this important element in Kant, that the formal intuition of space makes possible the ‘construction’ of geometrical concepts in geometrical proofs. The correlate for time would be that any awareness of determinate temporal relations is possible only if there is a temporal background, a ‘horizon of that which is intuited’.²⁹

More fully, as space as formal intuition ‘is that which is necessarily represented in advance

in finite human cognition', so time, as formal intuition, is given with every determinate intuition, as their original ground or condition. In the case of space, the determinate intuitions include, in part, the spatial representations used in the construction of geometrical proofs. For time, the determinate intuitions will be the representations of a particular temporal ordering- the successiveness or simultaneity of representations. And what must underlie such determinate representations is time as a formal intuition. That is, what underlies such determinate representations is another representation, the representation of those unique individuals, space and time.

We can now turn to the other key component of Kant's account- that time is infinite. I took this as a thesis about the containment of perceived regions of time within larger regions. And there is interesting fallout from this containment thesis. If any perceptually given, temporally located event implies a larger time, a larger portion of the individual, time, of which the temporally located event is part, then we have in essence brought the future into any perception. For any event in time we experience, that is, that event must be part of a larger time which too is given to us. And that larger time includes not only those times which are previous to the event experienced, but those that are after it. Enlarging the region of time would go in two directions, as enlargement of a region of space would go in three dimensions. And that means that a temporal spread, one comprising the past, present, and future, is given in any experience. That spread is given in that its various components, including the representation of future times, is necessarily presupposed in representations of determinate events in time. That spread underlies and makes possible everyday, ordinary experiences. The future is then, we might say, always present.

As is often the case, the point is more easily grasped with respect to space. Barrett makes the following, helpful observation about space.

If I look at the chair, I see it in a corner of the room; but I am also seeing it within the space of the whole room, although I need not be explicitly conscious at the moment of the rest of the room into which that corner is to be fitted. The corner of the room has a covert, but intrinsic, reference beyond itself to the space of the whole room of which it is part. The space of the room intrinsically point beyond itself to the space of the house, and that in turn to a larger space enclosing it...³⁰

From the spatial case, however, the parallel for time is easy to draw. When we are given any experience, in locating that experience within time we make reference to the larger portions of time in which that experience is located. We pull both the past and the future into such experiences. Even future times then are alive in our experiences of what we take to be present.

Finally, having made sense of the manner in which time, as *a priori* representation, as

unique individual, underlies our experiences of temporally situated events, and thereby of how times that are not present can permeate our experience of what is given, we are in a position to consider (albeit briefly) the manner in which we *do* experience the future. That is, we can address what an experience of a temporal spread amounts to- focusing again on the future elements of that spread.

Recall our two kinds of protentions, empirical and pure. Can we make sense of them now that we have understood time as a formal intuition? Empirical protentions are relatively easy. They include our expectations, anticipations, inferences, and the like regarding future times. This is not to say, as was critiqued above, that empirical protentions are simply a matter of having expectations. For as we saw, to make sense of those expectations states which are future directed requires a temporal element already at work. And we unpacked this ultimately in terms of time as formal intuition, time as a unique individual which provides the temporal backdrop for determinate temporally located experiences. But once we have the temporal background in place, as it were, then we are able to not only be in such future looking states as expectation and anticipation, we are able to be aware of them as such.

Pure protentions are more difficult, especially from a phenomenological position. I have already made use of Heidegger's notion of being thrown-ahead of ourselves, and I suspect we cannot do much better than that. What can be said, perhaps, is how we come to be aware of ourselves as so 'thrown'. For that sounds like a question which needs a phenomenological answer. Perhaps the following will do as a start.

Our ordinary experience, as described by the phenomenologist, is one of events in time. And those events are not perceived or experienced as temporally discrete moments, nor as instantaneous occurrences. Rather, we experience a moving field in which events which were present move into the background of the past, as those which loom on the horizon move inexorably towards us. When we step back from this temporal spread, we can abstract the temporally located events, while leaving their temporal framework behind. In so doing we can be said to grasp empty time. It is here that we can feel ourselves being thrown ahead into the future. For in that abstracting, we make contact, however thin it may be, with time as the underlying backdrop and pure individual. Our pure protentions, as I have called them, are those fleeting glimpses of the temporal framework which underlies and makes possible our ordinary experiences. And importantly, though there is abstraction involved in such protentions, the grasp of time we come to have is not the

original source of our representation of time and the future. Rather, we are able to experience such empty time, in that sense revealed in phenomenological analysis, only because time has been there all along. As Kant puts it,

But the case with this rule is the same as that with other pure a priori presentations (e.g., space and time): we can extract them as clear concepts from experience solely because we have put them into experience in the first place.³¹

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ENDNOTES

¹ An abbreviated portion of this paper was presented to the Philosophy of Time Society. I'd like to thank the participants, particularly Ronald Hoy, for helpful comments and criticism. Special thanks to Mary MacLeod for additional comments and advice.

² Lovejoy, *The Reason, the Understanding, and Time*, p.75.

³ Augustine, §15.

⁴ James too gives voice to this notion of a temporal spread. "Past and future...conceptually separated by the cut to which we give the name of the present...are to some extent, however, brief, co-present with each other throughout experience. The literally present moment is a purely verbal supposition, not a position; the only present ever realized concretely being the 'passing moment' in which the dying rearward of time and its dawning future forever mix their lights." *A Pluralistic Universe*, p.254. Bergson's writings are also relevant to this tradition.

⁵ Husserl, *Ideas*, p.92

⁶ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.416.

⁷ Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, p.53-4.

⁸ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.416.

⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §68.

¹⁰ Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, p.76. Husserl calls this sort of future presence, 'protentions in recollection', where protentions are those cognitive states which are future directed or forward looking. I will adopt his terminology where useful.

¹¹ "For after we have observ'd the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass to one object to its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger light upon account of that relation." Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p.165.

¹² Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, p.53-4.

¹³ Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, p.41.

¹⁴ Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, p.50-1. (My emphasis)

¹⁵ Miller's *Husserl, Perception and Temporal Awareness* presents an excellent discussion of these and other issues.

¹⁶ Another way to put the point is to simply ask how the vertical line C-F *means, stands for, or represents* a temporal series. There is nothing intrinsic to the picture that makes it so. Saying that the perceiver responds to that ordering with a temporal representation is to only gesture towards a solution.

¹⁷ This of course is related to the Kantian point that a succession of representations is not sufficient for a representation of a succession. "I can indeed say: My presentations follow one another. But that means only that we are conscious of them as being in a time sequence- in accordance, i.e. with the form of inner sense. Time is not, on that account, something in itself, nor is it a determination attaching to things objectively." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A38=B55. For a contemporary discussion of this point, see Sellars', *Science and Metaphysics*, Appendix.

Rosenberg's *The Thinking Self* also takes Husserl to task. Without going into the details here, Rosenberg finds Husserl's reliance on retentions to be inadequate. Instead, Rosenberg proposes that previous representations enter into our unified, instantaneous awareness of a succession as ones of which we are aware that we are, or were, aware of; as items of so called of meta-awareness. (p.231). But this account falls prey to the same worries as Husserl's. For again, it is by no means clear what a series of awarenesses, meta-awarenesses, meta-meta-awarenesses, etc. have to do with the representation of a *temporal* series.

¹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (A30=B46)

¹⁹ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p.414.

²⁰ Unfortunately, Husserl says very little about protentions beyond that which we have already made use of.

²¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (A30=B46).

²² Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (B160)

²³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (A32=B48).

²⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (A32=B48).

²⁵ Cf. Heidegger on this point. "What us represented in pure intuition is not an essent (no object, i.e. not something that appears) but yet not absolutely nothing." *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p.48. Also, "The representation of space is accordingly the immediate representation of a unique particular, an intuition...More precisely, and in accordance with what has been said above, space is what is intuited in a pure intuition.", p.50

²⁶ With respect to Kant's parallel argument for space, Allison articulates this as "however large a region of space one takes, it is always represented as bounded by more of the same." *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p.93.

²⁷ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p.49

²⁸ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p.150.

²⁹ Allison makes a similar point. "[T]he conceptualization of space, such as occurs in geometry, presupposes a preconceptual framework (in Kant's terms a 'pure manifold'), which both guides and limits this conceptual activity. Since this framework guides and constrains our conceptual activity (not only in geometry but also in 'outer experience'), it can be said to confront thought 'from without' as a brute irreducible datum." *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p.95.

³⁰ Barrett, "The Flow of Time", p.361. Barrett's remarks come in his discussion of Heidegger's view of time. A full discussion of Heidegger's views certainly deserve a paper of their own, and they cannot be done justice here. However, several remarks are in order. Barrett traces Heidegger's views concerning the manner in which the future figures in the present to the view that our present perceptions only make sense if the concepts we employ in such experiences make reference to future perceptions we are to have. A concept, according to Heidegger, tells us how to unify our sensory data; both past data, present data, and makes predictions about how that data will be in the future. But as I have tried to indicate above, talk of future perceptions itself presupposes a representation of time, including future times. I would draw the same moral with respect to Heidegger then as I did with Husserl: that only with a fully Kantian underwriting of their phenomenology can sense be made of representing the future.

³¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, (A196=B241)