LETTERS FROM SAIGO TAKAMORI TO ITAGAKI TAISUKE ON THE KOREAN QUESTION
In the summer of 1873, Saigo wrote eight letters to his friend Itagaki Taisuke on the Korean question. Three of these follow. All show Saigo's sincerity and straightforward simplicity.
]uly 29 1873,
    Thank you so much for coming all the way to visit me the other day. Has any decision been made on Korea, now that Soejima is back? If the meeting has yet to take place, I should like to be present despite my illness if am informed of what day I may attend. Please let me know.
When a decision is at last reached, what will it involve if we send troop first? The Koreans will unquestionably demand their withdrawal, and a refusal on our part will lead to war. We shall then have fomented a war in a manner very different from the one you originally had in mind. Wouldn't it be better therefore to send an envoy first? It is clear that if we did so, the Koreans would resort to violence and would certainly give us an excuse for attacking them.
In the event that it is decided to send troops first, difficulties may arise in the future [elsewhere]. Russia has fortified Sakhalin and other islands, and there have already been frequent incidents of violence. I am convinced that w should send troops to defend these places before we send them to Korea. If it is decided to send an envoy officially, I feel sure that he will be murdered. I therefore beseech you to send me. I cannot claim to make as splendid an envoy as Soejima, but if it is a question of dying, that, I assure you, I am prepared to do. August 14 [1873]
 
    Should there be any hesitation at your place with reference to my being sent, it will mean further and further delays. I ask you therefore please to cut short the deliberations and to speak out in favor of my being sent. If we fail to seize this chance to bring us into war, it will be very difficult to find another. By enticing the Koreans with such a gentle approach, we will certainly cause them to give us an opportunity for war. But this plan is doomed to fail if you feel it would be unfortunate for me to die before the war or if you have any thoughts of temporizing. The only difference is whether [my death comes] before or after the event. I shall be deeply grateful to you, even after death, if you exert yourself now on my behalf with the warm friendship you have always shown me. August 17 [1873]
 
    Last evening I visited the prime minister's residence and discussed my plan with him in great detail. . . . However, I could not help feeling uneasy when he said that he would wait until the return of the [Iwakura] mission. I have never meant to suggest an immediate outbreak of hostilities. War is the second step. Even under the present circumstances, grounds for starting a conflict might be found from an examination of international law, but they would be entirely a pretext, and the people of the nation would not accept them. But if we sent an envoy to tell the Koreans that we have never to this day harbored hostile intentions and to reproach them for weakening the relations between our countries, at the same time asking them to correct their arrogance of the past and strive for improved relations in the future, I am sure that the contemptuous attitude of the Koreans will reveal itself. They are absolutely certain, moreover, to kill the envoy. This will bring home to the entire nation the necessity of punishing their crimes. This is the situation that we must bring to pass if our plan is to succeed. I need hardly say that it is, at the same time, a far-reaching scheme that will divert abroad the attention of those who desire civil strife and thereby benefit the country. The [adherents of the] former government will lose the opportunity to act and, having to refrain from creating any internal disturbance, will lose the country once and for all.
[Dai Saigo zenshu, vol. 2, pp. 736-38, 751-52, 754-56; FN]

OKUBO TOSHIMICHI'S REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE KOREAN EXPEDITION
Although he had been a boyhood friend of Saigo Takamori, Okubo Toshimichi was less devoted to upholding the former samurai values and preserving the old system. He was also more a politician than a military figure and thus saw the threat to Japan in terms different from Saigo's. If Saigo was the quintessential samurai, Okubo, by comparison, can be seen as the quintessential bureaucrat. Okubo's consuming passion was internal order and systematic progress, which contrasted with Saigo's more imme­diate concerns for directing Japanese energies abroad. Okubo shared Kido Takayoshi's long-range vision and possessed a tenacity to pursue that vision over time. He also was capable of transcending domain loyalties and attracted to his side talented young men from other domains, such as Ito Hirobumi from Choshu and Okuma Shigenobu from Hizen. Although he was the chief architect and driving force behind the transforma­tion of Japan along modern lines in the i87os, Okubo's bold rejection of Saigo's planned Korean expedition and firm commitment to eliminate all feudal privileges, both of which led to the Satsuma Rebellion, ultimately cost him his life. In 1878, with the course of the Restoration clearly established, Okubo was assassinated by six former samurai. Indeed, all three of the major Restoration leaders—Okubo, Kido, and Saigo— died within a year of one another in 1877/1878, leaving the completion of the Resto­ration to their understudies, like Ito and Okuma. In 1873 it was Okubo's cold, clear logic that won the day in the council of state over Saigo's impetuous and dramatic appeal for a war with Korea.

    The most mature consideration and forethought are essential to govern the nation and to protect the land and the people. Every action, whether progressive or conservative, should be taken in response to the occasion and, if it develops unfavorably, should be abandoned. This may entail shame, but it is to be en­dured; justice may be with us, but we are not to choose that course. We must act as our greatest needs dictate, taking into account the importance of any problem and examining the exigencies. We have here the problem of dispatch­ing an envoy to Korea. The reasons why I am in no great haste to subscribe to the proposal come from much careful and earnest reflection on the problem.
The gist of my arguments is as follows:
1. Because of His Majesty's supreme virtue, sovereignty has been restored,
and extraordinary achievements have been made to bring about today's pros­perity. However, His Majesty's reign is still young, and its foundations are not yet firmly laid. The sudden abolition of feudal fiefs and the establishment of prefectures are indeed a drastic change unusual in history. A look at the situation in the capital seems to indicate that the change has been accomplished. But in the remote sections of the country there are not a few who have lost their homes and property and who are extremely bitter and restless because of this measure. . . . Within the last two years, how many scenes of bloodshed have taken place unavoidably? Owing to their misunderstanding of public procla­mations or their misgivings about rising taxes, the ignorant, uninformed people of the remote areas have become easy victims of agitation and have started riots. A careful consideration of these facts is the first argument against any hasty
action regarding Korea.
2. Government expenditure today is already tremendous, and there is the difficulty of matching the annual revenues with the annual expenditures. To start a war and to send tens of thousands of troops abroad would raise expen­ditures by the day to colossal figures; and should war be prolonged, expenditures would continue to soar so as to necessitate heavy taxes or a foreign loan, with no prospect of repayment, or the issuance of paper notes with no hope of redemption. . . . Our loans from foreign countries now exceed 5 million [yen], but we have no definite plan for their repayment. Even if a definite plan is evolved, the undertaking of the Korean venture would, in all likelihood, lead to a considerable deviation from our plans. It would be so disastrous as to preclude any chance of salvation. This is my second reason against any hasty action regarding Korea.
3. The government's present undertakings intended to enrich and strengthen the country must await many years for their fulfillment. These projects, in the areas of the army, navy, education, justice, industry, and colonization, are mat­ters that cannot be expected to produce results overnight. To launch a mean­ingless war now and waste the government's efforts and attention needlessly, increase annual expenditures to enormous figures, suffer the loss of countless lives, and add to the suffering of the people so as to allow no time for other matters will lead to the abandonment of the government's undertakings before their completion. In order to resume these undertakings, they would have to be started anew. . . . This is the third reason against the hasty commencement of a Korean war.
4. In looking at the sum total of our country's exports and imports, there is an annual shortage of exports of approximately 1 million [yen]. This deficit must be made up in gold. If gold in such quantity leaves the country, there will be a corresponding decrease in the country's gold reserves. At the present time the currency in use in the country consists of gold and paper. If gold is reduced, it will, in itself, impair the credit of the government, reduce the value of the paper notes, and cause considerable hardship to the people. It will produce a situation for which there may be no remedy later.... Now, without examining the wealth or poverty of our country or without clarifying the strength or weakness of our army, if we should hastily launch a war, our able-bodied youths would be sub­jected to hardships both at home and abroad, and their parents, out of worry and trouble, would lose their will to be thrifty or to work hard. ... It would inevitably lead to the impoverishment of our country. Such a state of affairs would be a matter of serious concern, which is the fourth reason against any hasty venture in Korea.
5. Turning to foreign relations, we note that for our country, Russia and England occupy the position of foremost and greatest importance. Russia, sit­uated in the north, could send its troops southward to Sakhalin and could, with one blow, strike south. . . . Thus, if we crossed arms with Korea and became like the two water birds fighting over a fish, Russia would be the fisherman
standing by to snare the fish. This is a matter of constant vigilance and is the fifth reason against a hasty venture in Korea.
6. England's influence is particularly strong in Asia. It has occupied lans everywhere and has settled its people and stationed its troops [in those places] Its warships are poised for any emergency, keeping a silent, vigilant watch, and are ready to jump at a moment's notice. However, our country has been largely dependent on England for its foreign loans. If our country becomes involved in an unexpected misfortune, causing our stores to be depleted and our people reduced to poverty, our inability to repay our debts to England will become it pretext for interfering in our internal affairs, which would lead to baneful con sequences beyond description. . . . This is the sixth reason against hasty action in Korea.
7. The treaties that our country has concluded with the countries of Europe and America are not equal, as they contain many terms that impair the dignity of an independent nation. The restraints they impose may bring some benefit but these treaties also contain harmful elements. England and France, for example, on the pretext that our country's internal administration is not yet ii order and that it cannot protect their subjects, have built barracks and stationed troops in our land as if our country were a territory of theirs. Externally, from the standpoint of foreign relations, is this not as much a disgrace as it is internally, from the standpoint of our nation's sovereignty? The time to revise the treaties is close at hand. The ministers in the current government, through their zealous and thorough attention, must find a way to rid the country of its bondage and to secure for our country the dignity of an independent nation. This is an urgent matter of the moment which provides the seventh reason why a hasty venture in Korea should not be undertaken.
I have argued in the foregoing paragraphs that a hasty Korean war should not be precipitated. . . . Before dispatching an envoy, the question of whether or not to embark on a war should be settled. Should the decision be to wage war, then more than a hundred thousand men for the campaign abroad and for the defense of the country should be raised. Moreover, additional tens of thousands of men should be called to escort the envoy. Although it is difficult to estimate in advance the enormous cost of ammunition, weapons, warships transports, and other expenses, it may well reach into tens of thousands daily Even if the campaign makes a favorable start, it is unlikely that the gains made will ever pay for the losses incurred. What would happen if the campaigin dragged on for months and years? Suppose total victory is gained, the entire country occupied, and the Koreans permitted to sue for peace and to indemnify us. Still, for many years, we would have to man garrisons to defend vital areas and to prevent any breach of the treaty's terms. When the entire country is occupied, it is certain that there will be many discontented people who will cause disturbances everywhere, making it almost impossible for us to hold the country. In considering the cost of the campaign, and the occupation and defense of Korea, it is unlikely that it could be met by the products of the entire country of Korea. Then there is Russia, and there is China. Although it is argued, on the basis of one or two conversations among officials or on the tacit understanding of officials, that Russia and China would not interfere in the Korean affair, there is no actual document to confirm it. Even if such a docu­ment existed, who can say that the governments of these two countries would not plot and take advantage of the opportunity to bring about a sudden and unexpected calamity? It is certainly not difficult to find an excuse to break an earlier promise. If we permit the initiation of such a great venture, blithely and with no consideration for such an eventuality, we shall in all probability have cause for much regret in the future. . . .
Some argue that Korea's arrogance toward our country is intolerable. But as far as I can see, the reasons for sending an envoy extraordinary seem to be to look for a positive excuse for war by having him treated arrogantly and dis­courteously. We would then dispatch troops to punish them. If this is the case, it is clear that this venture is to be undertaken, not because the situation makes it unavoidable or because there is no other way, but rather because the honor of the country will have been sullied and our sovereignty humiliated. I consider such a venture entirely beyond comprehension, as it completely disregards the safety of our nation and ignores the interest of the people. It would be an incident occasioned by the whims of individuals who have not seriously eval­uated the eventualities or implications. These are the reasons why I cannot accept the arguments for undertaking this venture.
[Kiyosawa, Gaiseika to shite Okubo Toshimichi, pp. 28-31; FN]
From DeBarry p.638